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Protecting Communities from Unwarranted 
Environmental Risks:  
A NEPA Solution for ICCTA Preemption 
Shata L. Stucky∗ 
In 1995, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission Termination Act (ICCTA)1 in an effort to relieve the 
railroad industry of burdensome regulation.2 The ICCTA pre-
empts local land use regulations that communities formerly 
employed to protect valuable resources such as drinking water 
supplies.3 Under some circumstances, the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA)4 provides the public with a degree of 
assurance that railroad projects will not unduly threaten the 
environment.5 However, because NEPA does not apply to all 
railroad projects, the ICCTA’s preemption provision continues 
to create a regulatory loophole through which railroad compa-
nies may undertake a variety of environmentally harmful ac-
tivities without any local or federal government oversight.6 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2002, 
Yale University. The author thanks Professor Bradley C. Karkkainen at the 
University of Minnesota Law School and Professor John P. Wargo at Yale 
University for their guidance. The author gives special thanks to Richard 
Rush with Friends of the Aquifer for providing research materials and local 
expertise. Finally, the author wishes to thank Luke Garrett; her parents, Deb-
bie and Rick; and Nick, Dan, and Ashley Stucky for their encouragement and 
support. Copyright © 2007 by Shata L. Stucky. 
 1. Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. 
No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 
U.S.C. (2000)). 
 2. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 82 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 793, 794. 
 3. See 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2000) (“[T]he remedies provided [by the 
ICCTA] with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and pre-
empt the remedies provided under . . . State law.”). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2000). 
 5. See id. § 4332(2)(C) (mandating the preparation of environmental im-
pact statements in certain instances). 
 6. See Train Refueling in Never-Never Land: A License to Spill?, LOC. 
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Theoretically, courts could close the loophole by interpreting 
the ICCTA narrowly.7 Yet no courts to date have taken this ap-
proach, and two courts of appeals have expressly rejected such 
an interpretation.8 Consequently, this Note recommends that 
Congress close the loophole through statute. 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the ICCTA’s 
preemption provision and examines the overlap between local 
and federal laws in the field of land use regulation. Part II 
demonstrates the consequences of the ICCTA’s preemption pro-
vision through a case study, showing that—even where railroad 
companies voluntarily seek local government approval to un-
dertake risky activities—the ICCTA skews the power structure 
and makes it difficult for governments to impose necessary re-
strictions. Finally, Part III concludes that the Surface Trans-
portation Board (STB)9 and the courts are unlikely to interpret 
the ICCTA in a way that would eliminate the regulatory loop-
hole, and that Congress should close this loophole by enacting a 
modified version of NEPA. 
I.  THE CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME   
In reviewing the regulatory landscape affecting railroad 
projects and land use decisions, this Note will describe (A) the 
origins of the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination 
Act and the Surface Transportation Board, (B) the breadth of 
the ICCTA’s preemption provision and the resulting regulatory 
loophole, and (C) the current state of land use regulation as di-
vided between local and federal governments. 
 
PLANET WKLY. (Spokane, Wash.), Feb. 21, 2001, at 7 (noting that, in certain 
instances, railroad companies are “essentially unregulated”). 
 7. See Maureen E. Eldredge, Note, Who’s Driving the Train? Railroad 
Regulation and Local Control, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 549, 586–89 (2004) (em-
phasizing that Congress intended to preempt local “economic” regulation of 
railroads and arguing that courts could close the loophole by adopting a nar-
row interpretation of the ICCTA). 
 8. See Green Mountain R.R. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 644–45 (2d Cir. 
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 547 (2005) (refusing to distinguish environ-
mental regulations from economic regulations); City of Auburn v. United 
States, 154 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the same distinction). 
 9. The STB is the administrative agency charged with adjudicating and 
resolving issues arising under the ICCTA. Overview of the STB, http://www 
.stb.dot.gov/stb/about/overview.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). 
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A. RAILROAD REGULATION AND THE SURFACE TRANSPORTATION 
BOARD 
Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission in 
1887 to prevent railroad companies—possessing certain charac-
teristics of natural monopolies—from exploiting the enormous 
power they wielded over the shippers and communities they 
served.10 By the 1970s, however, the railroad industry fell from 
its dominant position and was on the verge of collapse due to 
the emergence of the trucking, pipeline, and barge industries.11 
To save the industry, Congress began implementing a series of 
deregulation measures.12 One of these deregulation measures 
was the ICCTA.13 Noting “that the surface transportation in-
dustry is competitive and that few economic regulatory activi-
ties are required to maintain a balanced transportation net-
work,”14 Congress passed the ICCTA in 1995 with the goals of 
“eliminat[ing] obsolete rail provisions”15 and “keep[ing] bu-
reaucracy and regulatory costs at the lowest possible level, con-
sistent with affording remedies only where they are necessary 
and appropriate.”16 
The ICCTA effectively replaces the Interstate Commerce 
Commission with the Surface Transportation Board (STB), a 
smaller three-member independent adjudicatory panel17 within 
the Department of Transportation.18 The STB “has jurisdiction 
over railroad rate and service issues and rail restructuring 
transactions (mergers, line sales, line construction, and line 
abandonments)”19 and has a number of corresponding regula-
 
 10. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 90 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 793, 802. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. at 90–91, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 802–03 (listing 
several federal projects undertaken to improve the economic situation of the 
railroad industry, such as the creation of Amtrak in 1971 and the enactment 
of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980). 
 13. See id. at 93, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 805 (“[The ICCTA] 
builds on the deregulatory policies that have promoted growth and stability in 
the surface transportation sector.”). 
 14. Id. at 82, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 794. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 90, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 802. 
 18. See 49 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2000). The President may appoint STB board 
members with the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. § 701(b)(1). The Presi-
dent may not appoint more than two members from the same political party. 
Id. 
 19. Overview of the STB, supra note 9; see 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2000). 
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tory and adjudicatory responsibilities.20 Despite language in 
the ICCTA indicating that the STB’s jurisdiction is “exclu-
sive,”21 courts have recognized that the STB’s authority to ad-
judicate disputes and enforce liability against rail carriers does 
not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over these same types 
of matters.22 Consequently, parties alleging violations of the 
ICCTA may file complaints with either the STB or with federal 
courts. And parties wishing to file civil suits based on state law 
may bring actions in state courts, provided the state regulation 
falls outside the scope of ICCTA’s preemption provision.23 
When interpreting the ICCTA, courts defer to the STB, pro-
vided the Board’s interpretation is reasonable.24 
B. ICCTA PREEMPTION AND THE RESULTING REGULATORY 
LOOPHOLE 
Discussing changes to the railroad regulatory scheme, the 
House report on the ICCTA indicates that one of Congress’s in-
tentions in enacting the statute was to preempt entirely state 
economic regulation of railroads.25 Congress achieved this goal 
through the ICCTA’s general jurisdiction provision, section 
10501(b): 
The jurisdiction of the Board over— 
(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in 
this part with respect to rates, classifications, rules (including car 
 
 20. For example, the STB must decide whether to allow railroads to con-
struct extensions to railroad lines, construct additional railroad lines, or pro-
vide transportation over extended or additional lines. 49 U.S.C. § 10901(a)(1)–
(3) (2000). The STB also has the authority to (1) set rates, hear complaints re-
garding overcharging, and issue orders to stop related violations, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 10704(a)(1) (2000); (2) exempt railroads from antitrust laws, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 10706(a)(2)(A) (2000); and (3) prohibit the abandonment of railroad lines or 
the discontinuance of transportation services on grounds that it will have a 
serious, adverse impact on rural and community development, id. § 10901(a), 
(c). 
 21. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2000). 
 22. See Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 195, 
204–05 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that the ICCTA does not deprive federal courts 
of jurisdiction). 
 23. See id.; Eldredge, supra note 7, at 559–60 (“STB administrative reme-
dies augment but do not eliminate the role of federal and state courts.”). 
 24. See R.R. Ventures, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 299 F.3d 523, 548 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 
837, 843–45 (1984)); Eldredge, supra note 7, at 560 (“Even if an STB determi-
nation is not binding, it nonetheless strongly influences courts.”). 
 25. H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 95–96 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 793, 807–08. 
STUCKY_4FMT 2/22/2007 10:14:05 AM 
840 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:836 
 
service, interchange, and other operating rules), practices, routes, 
services, and facilities of such carriers; and 
(2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or dis-
continuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or 
facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be located, 
entirely in one State, is exclusive.26 
Furthermore, the general jurisdiction provision declares that 
“the remedies provided [by the ICCTA] with respect to regula-
tion of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the reme-
dies provided under Federal or State law.”27 
Following Supreme Court doctrine,28 courts assume that 
federal statutes do not supersede historic police powers of the 
states unless Congress clearly manifests such a purpose.29 Be-
cause land use regulation is an aspect of states’ police power,30 
courts and the STB have struggled to determine exactly which 
state and local land use laws are preempted by the ICCTA’s ex-
press preemption of state “regulation of rail transportation.”31 
To guide their decision making, the courts and the STB have 
developed several ways of articulating the scope of ICCTA pre-
emption. 
The STB and several courts have articulated an “integral 
to interstate operations” test, whereby the ICCTA preempts 
any local requirements that otherwise would be applied to fa-
cilities that are an integral part of the railroad’s interstate op-
erations.32 Under this test, local governments cannot apply 
 
 26. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“[W]e 
start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were 
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and mani-
fest purpose of Congress.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Vill. of Ridgefield Park v. N.Y., Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp., 
750 A.2d 57, 61 (N.J. 2000). 
 30. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389–90 (1926) 
(upholding zoning as a valid exercise of police powers delegated by states to 
their municipalities); JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROB-
ERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW § 3.5 (1998). 
 31. Although the specific language of section 10501(b) preempts “state 
law,” the STB and most courts do not distinguish between state and municipal 
law. See, e.g., City of Auburn v. United States, 154 F.3d 1025, 1028, 1030–31 
(9th Cir. 1998). Even the Eleventh Circuit, which has made such a distinction, 
notes that the ICCTA preempts municipal laws that have the effect of burden-
some state laws. See Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. City of W. Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 
1324, 1330–31 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 32. See, e.g., Green Mountain R.R. v. Vermont, Civil No. 1:01CV00181, 
2003 WL 24051562, at *4 (D. Vt. Dec. 15, 2003), aff ’d, 404 F.3d 638, 644–45 
(2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 547 (2005) (“Congress granted the STB 
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“state and local permitting or pre-clearance requirements (in-
cluding environmental requirements)” to integral facilities “be-
cause, by their nature, [the requirements] interfere with inter-
state commerce by giving the state or local body the ability to 
delay or deny the carrier the right to construct facilities or con-
duct operations.”33 This test requires the Board to make fine 
distinctions. For example, the STB determined that while an 
auto storage facility is integral to railroad operations,34 a corn 
processing plant is not integral because it is not integrally re-
lated to transportation services.35 
Despite ruling out all local zoning and pre-clearance re-
quirements that apply to integral railroad facilities, the STB 
emphasizes that localities retain certain police powers to pro-
tect public health and safety.36 The Board gives several exam-
ples of qualifying public health and safety regulations: local 
governments “can enforce, in a non-discriminatory manner, 
electrical and building codes”37 and “can take actions that are 
necessary and appropriate to address any genuine emergency 
on railroad property.”38 The STB also suggests that a local gov-
ernment could prohibit a railroad from dumping excavated 
earth into local waterways and could issue citations or seek 
damages if a railroad discharged harmful substances during a 
construction or upgrading project.39 Additionally, courts can en-
force agreements into which railroad companies have entered 
voluntarily, even in instances where the ICCTA would have 
shielded the company from its commitments under the con-
 
broadened preemptive jurisdiction over facilities that are an integral part of 
railroad transportation.”); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. City of Austell, No. CIVA1:97- 
CV-1018-RLV, 1997 WL 1113647, at *6–7 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 1997) (examining 
the type of facility the city sought to regulate); Boston & Me. Corp. & Town of 
Ayer, STB Finance Docket No. 33971, [2001] Fed. Carr. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 38,352 
(STB May 1, 2001) (“[Z]oning ordinances and local land use permit require-
ments are preempted where the facilities are an integral part of the railroad’s 
interstate operations.”) (joint petition for declaratory order), available at 
http://www.stb.dot.gov/decisions/ReadingRoom.nsf/UNID/874CABD848AA78E 
6852569BD00685772/$file/31506.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). 
 33. Boston & Me. Corp., [2001] Fed. Carr. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 48,513. 
 34. See Borough of Riverdale v. N.Y., Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp., 4 
S.T.B. 380, 389–90 (1999), available at http://www.stb.dot.gov/decisions/ 
ReadingRoom.nsf/UNID/87B3223E8C21403F852567D8006674FA/$file/29023 
.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). 
 35. See Boston & Me. Corp., [2001] Fed. Carr. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 48,513. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Borough of Riverdale, 4 S.T.B. at 389. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. 
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tract.40 The STB and several courts have suggested, however, 
that the ICCTA might preempt even “police powers” regula-
tions if they interfere with railroad operations.41 
Some courts articulate the preemption test somewhat dif-
ferently from the STB. For example, in Florida East Coast 
Railway Co. v. City of West Palm Beach, the Eleventh Circuit 
focused more broadly on Congress’s objective in enacting the 
ICCTA and considered whether the requirement at issue im-
peded the interstate functioning of the railroad industry.42 The 
court found that a city could apply its zoning ordinances to the 
lessee of railroad property that operated an aggregate distribu-
tion center because the zoning ordinance, as applied to the les-
see, did not “burden [the railroad] with the patchwork of regu-
lation that motivated the passage of the ICCTA.”43 
Despite slight differences in the tests adopted by the STB 
and courts, the approaches are similar in one important re-
spect: the environmental consequences of a railroad company’s 
activities do not factor into the decision making in any way. 
The decisions of the Board and the courts depend entirely on 
the regulations’ relationship to interstate commerce. The fact 
 
 40. See Green Mountain R.R. v. Vermont, Civil No. 1:01CV00181, 2003 
WL 24051562, at *5 (D. Vt. Dec. 15, 2003), aff ’d, 404 F.3d 638, 644–45 (2d Cir. 
2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 547 (2005). But see Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. 
Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 326, 333 (D. Me. 2003) (“[A] rail carrier 
that enters into such [voluntary] agreements is not precluded from arguing ‘as 
a matter of contract interpretation that: (1) unreasonable interference with 
interstate commerce would result if these voluntary agreements are inter-
preted [in the manner sought by the plaintiff ], and (2) in considering enforce-
ment, the court should give due regard to the impact on interstate commerce.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Twp. of Woodbridge v. Consol. Rail Corp., STB 
Docket No. 42053, at 3 (STB Mar. 23, 2001), available at http://www.stb.dot 
.gov/Decisions/readingroom.nsf/UNID/5B027F2DC87BE91485256A0D005890 
E1/$file/31546.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2006))). 
 41. See, e.g., Green Mountain R.R. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d at 643 (2d Cir. 
2005) (“It therefore appears that states and towns may exercise traditional po-
lice powers over the development of railroad property, at least to the extent 
that the regulations protect public health and safety, are settled and defined, 
can be obeyed with reasonable certainty, entail no extended or open-ended de-
lays, and can be approved (or rejected) without the exercise of discretion on 
subjective questions.”); Friends of the Aquifer, STB Finance Docket No. 33966, 
at 4 (STB Aug. 10, 2001) (suggesting that certain “police powers” regulations 
cannot be applied if they unreasonably restrict the railroad from conducting 
its operations, or unreasonably burden interstate commerce), available at 
http://www.stb.dot.gov/decisions/ReadingRoom.nsf/UNID/4FF2DCB99468FEB 
785256A960055F496/$file/31505.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). 
 42. See Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. City of W. Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 
1337–39 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 43. Id. at 1339. 
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that a project poses an unacceptable environmental risk has no 
legal significance. 
Fortunately, federal law provides some environmental re-
lief in select instances. The National Environmental Policy 
Act44 (NEPA) requires federal agencies to prepare and consider 
environmental impact statements before undertaking any ma-
jor federal action likely to have a significant effect on the envi-
ronment.45 Because courts have interpreted the term “major 
federal action” broadly to include private projects that require 
federal approval,46 the STB must comply with NEPA require-
ments when it issues a federal license.47 Consequently, when-
ever a railroad company applies for a federal license and the li-
censed activity is likely to have a significant effect on the 
environment, the STB must prepare and consider an environ-
mental impact statement. 
NEPA and the federal regulations pertaining to NEPA re-
quire the STB, when evaluating railroad projects that may im-
pact the human environment, to (1) “identify and develop 
methods and procedures . . . which will insure that presently 
unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given 
appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with eco-
nomic and technical considerations;”48 (2) “study, develop, and 
describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of 
action in any proposal;”49 and (3) provide the public with rele-
vant information50 and “assess and consider [public] comments 
both individually and collectively.”51 Additionally, NEPA per-
 
 44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2000). 
 45. Id. § 4332(2)(C) (requiring “all agencies of the Federal Government” to 
“include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and 
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official”). 
 46. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a) (2005) (“[Major federal] actions include new 
and continuing activities, including projects and programs entirely or partly 
financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal agencies 
. . . .”). 
 47. See 49 U.S.C. § 10901(a) (2000); Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Sur-
face Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 533 (8th Cir. 2003) (describing the STB’s ap-
proval process, which includes environmental impact assessment under 
NEPA). 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B). 
 49. Id. § 4332(2)(E). 
 50. See 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(4) (2005); Council on Environmental Quality, 
Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting the Environment, Guide-
lines § 10(e), 36 Fed. Reg. 7724, 7726 (April 23, 1971). 
 51. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4(a) (2005). 
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mits the STB to put further restrictions on railroads through 
the imposition of appropriate environmental mitigation meas-
ures not already included in proposed actions or alternatives.52 
The problem is that the ICCTA only requires railroad com-
panies to get licenses for line extensions, new lines, and acqui-
sition of lines by non-rail carriers.53 Other projects do not re-
quire STB authorization; therefore they are not “major federal 
actions” and do not trigger NEPA requirements. Put another 
way, where the STB does not have licensing authority, it has no 
authority to create and consider an environmental impact 
statement54—even where potential environmental impacts are 
significant.55 Importantly, this rule applies regardless of 
whether the ICCTA preempts state and local laws in a particu-
lar instance. Thus, a railroad company could both escape NEPA 
requirements and be free of environmental restrictions at the 
local level.56 Several projects have fallen within this regulatory 
loophole. These projects have included track upgrades and re-
furbishments,57 the extensions or additions of railroad lines 
that do not allow railroads to enter a new market,58 and the 
construction of car unloading facilities59 and diesel refueling 
depots.60 If a railroad project falls within this regulatory loop-
hole, there is little communities can do to protect themselves 
from environmental damage. 
 
 52. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(f ) (2005). 
 53. See 49 U.S.C. 10901(a) (2000). 
 54. See Friends of the Aquifer, STB Finance Docket No. 33966, at 3 (STB 
Aug. 10, 2001) (“Because we lack licensing authority over the project, the envi-
ronmental review provisions of NEPA do not apply.”), available at http://www 
.stb.dot.gov/decisions/ReadingRoom.nsf/UNID/4FF2DCB99468FEB785256A96 
0055F496/$file/31505.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). 
 55. See id. at 8 (“It is clear that the potential significance of an environ-
mental issue, by itself, does not confer regulatory authority on the Board.”). 
 56. Id. at 6. 
 57. See Cities of Auburn & Kent, 2 S.T.B. 330, 331–35 (1997). 
 58. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. 3 S.T.B. 646, 650 (1998). 
 59. See Boston & Me. Corp. & Town of Ayer, STB Finance Docket No. 
33971, [2001] Fed. Carr. Cas. (CCH) ¶¶ 48,515–48,517 (STB May 1, 2001) 
(joint petition for declaratory order), available at http://www.stb.dot.gov/ 
decisions/ReadingRoom.nsf/UNID/874CABD848AA78E6852569BD00685772/ 
$file/31506.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). 
 60. See Friends of the Aquifer, STB Finance Docket No. 33966, at 1–3 
(STB Aug. 10, 2001), available at http://www.stb.dot.gov/decisions/ 
ReadingRoom.nsf/UNID/4FF2DCB99468FEB785256A960055F496/$file/31505 
.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). 
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C. LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT 
WITH LAND USE REGULATION 
The STB implies that the regulatory loophole is not as gap-
ing as it might first seem. The Board claims that even where it 
lacks the authority to conduct an environmental assessment 
under NEPA, “the lack of licensing and conditioning authority 
at the Board or at the local level does not mean that there are 
no environmental remedies under other Federal laws.”61 This 
statement is worth analyzing because just as the ICCTA pre-
empts “State law,” it also expressly preempts federal regulation 
of railroad transportation.62 Interestingly, courts have not hesi-
tated to apply NEPA to railroad projects.63 Some companies 
have argued that the ICCTA preempts other federal environ-
mental laws;64 however, neither the STB nor the courts have 
ruled on this issue.65 However, the STB indicated in dicta that 
the ICCTA might preempt a federal environmental law if it un-
duly burdened interstate commerce.66 
With respect to the loophole at issue in this Note, however, 
the ICCTA’s preemption of federal law is of limited importance. 
Because of the special role local governments play in regulating 
land use, the loophole described above would remain even if the 
courts were to decide that the ICCTA did not preempt federal 
law, or preempted it in a very limited number of circumstances. 
Local governments and the federal government play very 
different roles in regulating land use. As noted above, land use 
regulation falls primarily within the province of the states as 
 
 61. See id. at 6. 
 62. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2000) (“[T]he remedies provided [by the ICCTA] 
with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the 
remedies provided under Federal or State law.” (emphasis added)). 
 63. See, e.g., Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 
F.3d 520, 533–34 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 64. See Boston & Me. Corp., [2001] Fed. Carr. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 48,513 
(“[Railroad company] Guilford contends that the [Safe Drinking Water Act] 
and [the Clean Water Act] are not applicable here; that, if those statutes ap-
ply, ICCTA preempts them . . . .”). 
 65. See Eldredge, supra note 7, at 574–75. 
 66. See, e.g., Friends of the Aquifer, STB Finance Docket No. 33966, at 5 
(STB Aug. 10, 2001) (“[N]othing in section 10501(b) is intended to interfere 
with the role of state and local agencies in implementing Federal environ-
mental statutes . . . unless the regulation is being applied in such a manner as 
to unduly restrict the railroad from conducting its operations or unreasonably 
burden interstate commerce.”), available at http://www.stb.dot.gov/ 
decisions/ReadingRoom.nsf/UNID/4FF2DCB99468FEB785256A960055F496/ 
$file/31505.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). 
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an aspect of their police power.67 Most states delegate their 
land use regulation powers to local governments through zon-
ing enabling acts.68 Pursuant to their delegated powers, local 
governments typically divide the area they govern into zones 
and permit certain types of activities, or uses, within each par-
ticular zone.69 Areas may be zoned for dozens of different uses 
if the government views those uses as compatible with, or at 
least as not imposing significant external costs on, the other 
permitted uses.70 
There are three main ways by which a use that does not fit 
within any use zone may gain approval. First, a local board 
may deal with a use on a case-by-case basis through an admin-
istrative process that examines any unusual harm the use may 
cause to neighboring land.71 If the use successfully passes the 
administrative review, the reviewing board may issue a special-
use permit (also known as a conditional use or special per-
mit).72 Secondly, a local government may grant approval for a 
particular use by issuing a zoning “variance.”73 Administrative 
boards normally grant variances if prohibiting the use would 
cause the applicant inevitable hardship due to the distinctive 
features of his property.74 The third way a use may gain ap-
proval is if the local government amends zoning regulations to 
permit previously banned uses.75 
Beyond zoning regulations, many state and local govern-
ments have also adopted comprehensive plans that set “goals, 
 
 67. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389–90 (1926) 
(upholding zoning as a valid exercise of police powers delegated by states to 
their municipalities); JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 30, § 3.5. Tra-
ditionally, states have delegated much of their authority to regulate land use 
to local governments, though the type of local government varies from counties 
to cities to towns to other local governing bodies. Id. However, some states 
have made an effort to account for the broad impact of land use decisions by 
adopting state-wide and even region-wide multiple-state management pro-
grams. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, 
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 710, 714–15 (4th ed. 2003). 
 68. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 30, § 3.5. 
 69. Id. § 4.1. 
 70. Id. § 4.2(B). 
 71. Id. § 5.24(A). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. § 5.14. However, courts are frequently reluctant to uphold vari-
ances on appeal without clear factual support. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. § 5.6. 
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objectives and policies to guide land-use decisionmaking . . . .”76 
In some instances, these comprehensive plans direct planning 
boards to consider a project’s impact on environmental con-
cerns, such as air and water quality.77 
The states’ approach to land use regulation is comprehen-
sive. As noted above, local governments divide land under their 
control into use zones and in that way comprehensively regu-
late all the uses of all the land within the jurisdiction.78 Fur-
thermore, from the outset, state zoning enabling acts required 
that zoning be in “accordance with a comprehensive plan,”79 
and that remains the ideal in local land use regulation today.80 
By contrast, federal environmental laws are narrowly tailored 
and fragmented.81 They typically target one type of environ-
mental harm, either directly82 or indirectly.83 NEPA is the only 
 
 76. Id. § 2.9. 
 77.  For example, the Kootenai County Planning Department’s compre-
hensive plan includes the following focus statement: “Recognizing that human 
activities have precipitated water and air quality contamination or degrada-
tion, the Comprehensive Plan encourages mitigation of existing problems, 
while also promoting future development practices which benefit water and 
air quality.” See Kootenai County Idaho Comprehensive Plan, http://www.co 
.kootenai.id.us/departments/planning/complan/goal1.asp (last visited Dec. 5, 
2006). 
 78. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 30, § 4.2. 
 79. Id. § 2.11. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, upon which all 
fifty states substantially patterned their enabling acts, id. § 3.6, requires local 
governments to make zoning decisions “in accordance with a comprehensive 
plan,” id. § 2.11.  
 80. Many courts have found that state zoning enabling acts do not actu-
ally mandate the development of a comprehensive plan. Id. (discussing Kozes-
nick v. Montgomery Twp., 131 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1957)). Nevertheless these courts 
have emphasized that zoning enabling acts requires local governments to take 
a comprehensive approach to land use regulation. See, e.g., Kozesnick, 131 
A.2d at 7 (“[I]t may be said for present purposes that ‘plan’ connotes an inte-
grated product of a rational process and ‘comprehensive’ requires something 
beyond a piecemeal approach . . . .”). 
 81. See Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regula-
tion, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 29–30 (2001). 
 82. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 67, at 705. For example, section 404 
of the Clean Water Act requires a permit “for the discharge of dredged or fill 
material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.” 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344(a) (2001); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. 
§ 1271(a)(2) (2001) (prohibiting strip mining in areas where it creates immi-
nent danger to the health or safety of the public or where it is reasonably ex-
pected to cause significant environmental harm); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2001) (requiring landowners to obtain a permit 
from the State before effecting an underground injection that may endanger 
drinking water sources). In certain instances, the Endangered Species Act also 
prohibits private landowners from using their land in a way that significantly 
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federal statute that approaches the comprehensiveness of local 
land use regulation. It is unique because of its broad applica-
tion and the way that it targets environmental impacts gener-
ally.84 
In sum, with the exception of NEPA, federal environmental 
laws are extremely narrow in scope. Congress has anticipated 
and addressed specific problems, but has left the bulk of land 
use management to the states. Considering the differences be-
tween local and federal law, courts and legislators should not 
assume that, in the absence of state and local laws, federal 
laws provide adequate environmental protection for local com-
munities. 
II.  WHERE RAILROAD PROJECTS DO NOT TRIGGER 
NEPA REVIEW UNDER THE ICCTA,  
RAILROAD COMPANIES ARE FREE TO CREATE 
SIGNIFICANT RISKS FOR COMMUNITIES.   
As noted above, some railroad projects are subject neither 
to NEPA requirements nor to local zoning and land use restric-
tions.85 The STB claims that, while the Board lacks licensing 
authority over these projects and therefore cannot conduct an 
environmental assessment under NEPA, other federal laws 
may provide environmental remedies.86 However, although fed-
eral laws may provide relief in some instances, there are situa-
 
modifies the habitat of endangered species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) 
(2001) (making it unlawful to “take any [endangered] species”); 50 C.F.R. 
§ 17.3 (2005) (“Harm in the definition of ‘take’ in the Act means an act which 
actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat 
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by sig-
nificantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, 
or sheltering.”). 
 83. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 30, §§ 11.2–.6 (giving in-
depth descriptions of federal environmental laws that impact land use deci-
sions); PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 67, at 705–08 (listing several federal stat-
utes that indirectly influence land use patterns). 
 84. See Michael Herz, Parallel Universes: NEPA Lessons for the New 
Property, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1668, 1677 (1993) (“Among modern environmental 
statutes, NEPA is unique in its brevity, its scope, and its virtually exclusive 
emphasis on procedures and broad values rather than standards and narrow 
requirements.”). 
 85. See Flynn v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp. (BNSF), 98 F. Supp. 2d 
1186, 1188–89 (E.D. Wash. 2000). 
 86. Friends of the Aquifer, STB Finance Docket No. 33966, at 6 (STB Aug. 
10, 2001), available at http://www.stb.dot.gov/decisions/ReadingRoom.nsf/ 
UNID/4FF2DCB99468FEB785256A960055F496/$file/31505.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2006). 
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tions where federal laws will not adequately substitute for local 
land use regulations. This section documents one such case and 
demonstrates how the ICCTA disrupts the typical power struc-
ture that otherwise exists to protect communities. 
A. CASE STUDY: RAILROAD REFUELING STATION ATOP THE 
SPOKANE VALLEY-RATHDRUM PRAIRIE AQUIFER 
On August 10, 2001, the STB issued a ruling of special sig-
nificance to people living in eastern Washington and northern 
Idaho. The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway (BNSF) 
planned to build a refueling depot in Hauser, Idaho directly 
atop the Spokane Valley-Rathdrum Prairie Aquifer, a sole 
source87 aquifer that provides water for more than four hun-
dred thousand people in the area.88 While BNSF claimed that 
“monitoring systems, concrete barriers and underground plastic 
liners would guard against [drinking water] contamination,”89 
local experts expressed doubt.90 Community groups pointed to 
BNSF’s poor environmental record.91 The health districts of 
North Idaho and Spokane, Washington came out against the 
depot, fearing its impact on public health,92 and the Idaho Divi-
sion of Environmental Quality noted that the spill scenarios 
BNSF initially modeled used conservative assumptions.93 
 
 87. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) officially named the 
Spokane Valley-Rathdrum Prairie Aquifer a sole source aquifer in 1978. See 
Robert Harper, Valley Aquifer Said Water ‘Sole Source,’ SPOKESMAN-REV. 
(Spokane, Wash.), Feb. 7, 1978, at A1. “Sole Source Aquifer designations are 
one tool to protect drinking water supplies in areas with few or no alternative 
sources to the ground water resource, and where if contamination occurred, 
using an alternative source would be extremely expensive.” Sole Source Aqui-
fer Protection Program FAQs, http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/ssa/faq.htm#Q1 
(“[A]quifers must supply at least 50 percent of the drinking water to persons 
living over the aquifer; there can be no other feasible sources of drinking water 
that could replace the aquifer; and there must be clearly definable aquifer 
boundaries.”) (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). 
 88. Zaz Hollander, BNSF Consultant Revises Diesel Spill Scenarios, 
SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Aug. 12, 1999, at B1. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id.; Zaz Hollander, Depot Foes Challenge BN Studies, SPOKESMAN-
REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Nov. 17, 1999, at A11. 
 91. See Ken Olsen, Depot Foes Point to BN Track Record: 8 of 14 Montana 
Stations Polluted Ground Water, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), May 12, 
1998, at A1. 
 92. See Zaz Hollander, Health District Opposes Fuel Depot, SPOKESMAN-
REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Sept. 17, 1999, at B1. 
 93. See Letter from John Sutherland, Reg’l Manager of Remediation, 
State of Idaho Div. of Envtl. Quality, to Mark P. Stehly, Burlington N. Santa 
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The STB determined that, while state and local govern-
ment regulations were preempted under the ICCTA’s section 
10501(b), the Board lacked licensing authority over the project 
and therefore could not order an environmental review under 
NEPA.94 In deciding that it did not have the authority to order 
an environmental review of BNSF’s project, the STB empha-
sized that the railroad company must comply with federal envi-
ronmental statutes such as the Clean Water Act and the Safe 
Drinking Water Act, provided the statutes were not applied in 
such a manner as to unduly restrict the railroad from conduct-
ing its operations or unreasonably burden interstate com-
merce.95 
Even if experts, agencies, citizens’ groups, and BNSF 
agreed the refueling facility was sure to pollute the aquifer be-
cause it lacked adequate environmental safeguards, no federal 
law would provide the means to prevent the project. The two 
most likely candidates mentioned by the Board, the Clean Wa-
ter Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act, would not come into 
play. The Clean Water Act essentially prohibits the discharge 
of pollutants into navigable waters.96 BNSF did not plan to dis-
charge anything into any navigable waters. Similarly, the Safe 
Drinking Water Act would not affect the project because it re-
quires states, not private actors, to maintain certain drinking 
water standards.97 Federal laws simply fail to provide the often 
local remedies that the public sought in this instance: an as-
sessment of environmental risks and an assurance that the pro-
ject’s potential impact on public health would receive due con-
 
Fe 1 (Nov. 2, 1999) (on file with author). 
 94. Friends of the Aquifer, STB Finance Docket No. 33966, at 6 (STB Aug. 
10, 2001), available at http://www.stb.dot.gov/decisions/ReadingRoom.nsf/ 
UNID/4FF2DCB99468FEB785256A960055F496/$file/31505.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2006). 
 95. See id. 
 96. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2000). 
 97. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-1 to g-3 (2001). While it is possible to argue that 
the ICCTA does not preempt local regulations that merely implement a federal 
law such as the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), the STB has rejected such 
arguments. See Boston & Me. Corp. & Town of Ayer, STB Finance Docket No. 
33971, [2001] Fed. Carr. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 48,513 (STB May 1, 2001) (joint petition 
for declaratory order) (“[E]ven if [the Clean Water Act and the Safe Drinking 
Water Act] were found to be applicable, it appears that Ayer is simply using 
them as a pretext to do what Congress expressly precluded: interfere with in-
terstate commerce by imposing a local permitting or environmental process as 
a prerequisite to the railroad’s ability to conduct its operations.”), available at 
http://www.stb.dot.gov/decisions/ReadingRoom.nsf/UNID/874CABD848AA78E 
6852569BD00685772/$file/31506.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). 
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sideration in the decision-making process. Once a significant oil 
spill has occurred, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
restore contaminated groundwater to a condition suitable for 
beneficial use.98 Contrary to the STB’s suggestions, there is no 
federal environmental law outside of NEPA that considers the 
benefits of stopping aquifer pollution before it occurs. 
Four months after the refueling depot opened on August 
31, 2004, Idaho regulators reported that contaminated waste-
water had reached the aquifer due to a broken plastic pipe at 
the BNSF depot.99 Regulators discovered several other leaks in 
the ensuing months; finally, on February 23, 2005, the Idaho 
Department of Environmental Quality succeeded in obtaining 
an emergency court order closing the depot until all the prob-
lems could be fixed.100 Between 2,000 and 3,000 gallons of die-
sel and motor oil had leaked into the aquifer—an amount too 
small to be considered a public health threat.101 BNSF paid $7 
million to fix the problem, a $100,000 fine, and Idaho’s legal 
and overtime costs.102 
Would the outcome have been different under a local regu-
latory scheme? A close look at the events leading up to the con-
struction of the refueling facility shed some light on this in-
quiry. BNSF voluntarily submitted to the local permit approval 
process for the construction and operation of a locomotive fuel-
ing facility in Hauser, Idaho, atop the aquifer.103 The company 
 
 98. Linly Ferris & David Rees, CERCLA Remedy Selection: Abandoning 
the Quick Fix Mentality, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 785, 828–29 (1994). Removal of pol-
lutants is particularly difficult where they become trapped in the solid layers 
of the subsurface surrounding the aquifer and are continually reabsorbed into 
the water. Id. at 829–31. 
 99. Dan Hansen, Week in Review, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), 
Dec. 26, 2004, at B3. 
 100. James Hagengruber, Depot Gets Fix; Cracks in Credibility Remain, 
SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Mar. 22, 2005, at A17. 
 101. Rocky Barker, DEQ Chief Can Be Tough When She Needs to Be, 
IDAHO STATESMAN (Boise, Idaho), June 6, 2005, at 1. 
 102. Id.; Idaho Dept. of Envtl. Quality, Overview of Water Quality in the 
Coeur d’Alene Region: DEQ/BNSF Agreement to Protect Ground Water Qual-
ity, http://www.deq.state.id.us/about/regions/cro_bnsf.cfm (last visited Dec. 5, 
2006). 
 103. BNSF may have volunteered because it was concerned about commu-
nity relations. See Ken Olsen, Railroad Hires PR Firm to Address Aquifer 
Concerns, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), July 14, 1998, at A1 (reporting 
that BNSF hired a public relations firm “to help [them] better assess concerns 
of the community”). 
STUCKY_4FMT 2/22/2007 10:14:05 AM 
852 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:836 
 
applied for two conditional use permits,104 one for the above-
ground storage of more than twenty thousand gallons of fuel 
and one for a public utility complex facility.105 The Kootenai 
County Board of County Commissioners, a three-person panel 
presiding over land use and other issues in the county where 
the BNSF depot would be built, noted that the BNSF property 
was zoned as industrial under the Kootenai County Zoning Or-
dinance.106 As such, the property was “suitable for manufactur-
ing and processing of all types,”107 but not for the storage of pe-
troleum. The Board of Commissioners recognized that the 
storage of petroleum was therefore a conditional rather than an 
outright permitted use and consequently must conform to the 
conditional use standards set forth in the Zoning Ordinance.108 
After examining BNSF’s proposal, the Commissioners im-
posed thirty-three conditions on the permit and approved the 
plan, finding not only that the project was in compliance with 
the performance standards of the County’s Zoning Ordinance, 
but also that it was in conformance with the County’s Compre-
hensive Plan and was in the public interest.109 The Commis-
 
 104. Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance No. 348 defines “conditional use” 
as: 
[a] use listed among those classified in any given zone but permit-
ted to locate only after review and which requires a special degree 
of control to make such use compatible with other permitted uses 
in the same vicinity and zone and assure against imposing exces-
sive demands upon public utilities and facilities.  
Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance No. 348, Art. 2, § 2.02 (Feb. 8, 2005), 
available at http://www.co.kootenai.id.us/departments/planning/ordinance.asp 
(follow “Ordinance No. 348” hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 1, 2006). This defini-
tion was operative when the Board made its decision. See County Commis-
sioners of Kootenai County, Idaho, In re Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R., Case 
No. C-999-99, at *19 (Apr. 19, 2000) (copy of decision on file with author and 
the Minnesota Law Review). 
 105. See County Commissioners of Kootenai County, Idaho, In re Burling-
ton N. & Santa Fe R.R., at *1. Definitions of the two permit types can be found 
in the Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance. Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance 
No. 348, Art. 2, § 2.02 (Feb. 8, 2005), available at http://www.co.kootenai.id.us/ 
departments/planning/ordinance.asp (follow “Ordinance No. 348” hyperlink) 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006). 
 106. Id. at *19. 
 107. Id. (quoting Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance No. 348, Art. 11, 
§ 11.00). 
 108. See County Commissioners of Kootenai County, Idaho, In re Burling-
ton N. & Santa Fe R.R., at *19. 
 109. See id. at *19, 28–35. Under the Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance, 
“conditional uses, because of their public convenience and necessity, may be 
permitted only after finding that the conditional use proposed will be in con-
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sioners’ decision indicates that the spill at the depot would 
have occurred even if the ICCTA had not preempted local zon-
ing laws. Perhaps the spill would have been worse if the 
County had not imposed the thirty-three conditions on the pro-
ject—conditions enforceable despite the ICCTA’s preemption 
provisions.110 But, taking the Commissioners’ decision at face 
value, one could conclude that the ICCTA preemption provi-
sions were not responsible for the leak. 
A more probing look at the permit approval process, how-
ever, indicates that perhaps the Commissioners’ decision 
should not be taken at face value. There is some evidence to 
suggest that the Kootenai County Commissioners approved 
BNSF’s proposal primarily because they were aware of the 
ICCTA’s preemption provision. The final vote on the permit 
was two Commissioners in favor of the project and one 
against.111 One of the Commissioners who voted in favor of the 
project told a local paper that the preemptive effect of federal 
law influenced his decision: “the county could lose the right to 
apply any conditions to depot operations if it rejected the rail-
road’s application and BNSF turned to the federal Surface 
Transportation Board for relief.”112 Defending his decision, the 
commissioner said, “If something is going to be imposed on you, 
you should at least try to control the game. . . .”113 Despite giv-
ing the public opportunities to voice its concerns at public hear-
ings, the Commissioners and other County representatives ap-
peared to conduct much of the depot negotiations in closed 
meetings with BNSF executives.114 These facts indicate that 
this was not the typical conditional use permit application and 
approval process in that BNSF was not really seeking approval. 
 
formance with the Comprehensive Plan and will be in the public interest.” 
Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance No. 348, Art. 30, § 30.01(A)(2) (Feb. 8, 
2005), available at http://www.co.kootenai.id.us/departments/planning/ 
ordinance.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2006). 
 110. See Twp. of Woodbridge v. Consol. Rail Corp., STB Docket No. 42053, 
at 5 (STB Mar. 23, 2001) (enforcing a contract into which a railroad voluntar-
ily entered), available at http://www.stb.dot.gov/Decisions/readingroom.nsf/ 
UNID/5B027F2DC87BE91485256A0D005890E1/$file/31546.pdf) (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2006). 
 111. County Commissioners of Kootenai County, Idaho, In re Burlington N. 
& Santa Fe R.R., at *35. 
 112. Zaz Hollander, Depot Above Aquifer Approved, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spo-
kane, Wash.), Mar. 7, 2000, at A1. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Alison Boggs, Railroad Proposes Depot-Lite, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spo-
kane, Wash.), June 29, 1999, at A1. 
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The company would make the final decision: if the County’s 
conditions were too restrictive, BNSF could simply withdraw 
its application and build the depot on its own terms. 
Prior to the Commissioners’ final decision, the County 
Board appointed a hearing examiner to hold a public hearing 
and issue a recommendation on the permit application.115 Be-
cause the examiner’s decision would have no binding effect and 
therefore would be unlikely to cause BNSF to withdraw its ap-
plication, the examiner was less restricted by BNSF’s demands 
than were the Commissioners. Consequently, her conclusions 
are worth noting as they arguably demonstrate a more typical 
application of local and state law to BNSF’s permit. 
The hearing examiner recommended to the Kootenai 
County Board of Commissioners that BNSF’s application for 
the conditional use permit be denied.116 She found that al-
though the proposal was in conformance with the Zoning Ordi-
nance’s technical requirements and the technical requirements 
of other agency regulations, it did not satisfy the requirements 
of the County’s Comprehensive Plan.117 The examiner focused 
on Goal Twenty of the Comprehensive Plan, which aims to 
“[p]rotect water quality to ensure adequate quantity and qual-
ity of drinking water to meet the current and future needs in 
the County,”118 and recommended that the Commissioners re-
quire BNSF to take several actions in order to obtain approval, 
including moving the fuel tanks to a location that was not over 
the aquifer.119 Had the Commissioners followed the recommen-
dations of the hearing examiner, as they usually do,120 the 
County very likely would have avoided aquifer contamination. 
 
 115. Thomas Clouse, Examiner Advises Against Depot, SPOKESMAN-REV. 
(Spokane, Wash.), Jan. 4, 2000, at A1. 
 116. See Hearing Examiner of Kootenai County, Idaho, In re Burlington N. 
& Santa Fe R.R., Case No. C-999-99, at *18 (Dec. 29, 1999). 
 117. See id. at *11. 
 118. Comprehensive Plan, Goal 20, http://www.co.kootenai.id.us/ 
departments/planning/complan/goal20.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2006); Hearing 
Examiner of Kootenai County, Idaho, In re Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R., 
Case No. C-999-99, at *14–16. 
 119. Hearing Examiner of Kootenai County, Idaho, In re Burlington N. & 
Santa Fe R.R., at *18–19. 
 120. One Commissioner estimated that, in the three years preceding the 
hearing examiner’s recommendation regarding the BNSF depot, the Commis-
sioners followed the hearing examiners’ recommendations in about eighty per-
cent of the cases presented. See Clouse, supra note 115. He went on to con-
clude that “[the] commissioners seldom go against the hearing examiner.” Id. 
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It is impossible to know exactly what would have occurred 
in the absence of the ICCTA’s preemption of local and state 
laws. The hearing examiner’s recommendation gives some in-
sight into the normal application process; however, she may 
have made a more restrictive recommendation than normal to 
counterbalance the enormous influence of BNSF, given the 
ICCTA’s preemptive effect. It is also impossible to guess how a 
NEPA environmental assessment would have affected the pro-
ject. Nonetheless, this case study demonstrates that, while cor-
porate citizens may make an effort to cooperate with local offi-
cials and respond to public demands, the ICCTA’s preemption 
provision puts railroad companies in the driver’s seat where it 
comes to irreplaceable, vital public resources. 
III.  ELIMINATING THE LOOPHOLE   
While some courts have permitted local governments to 
apply environmental and land use regulations to railroads, no 
court has interpreted the ICCTA in a way that will close the 
loophole. Furthermore, the Ninth and Second Circuits have ex-
plicitly rejected such an interpretation.121 Consequently, Con-
gress must take action to protect communities. This Note dem-
onstrates that Congress should enact a modified version of 
NEPA in order to close the regulatory gap. 
A. THE STB AND COURTS HAVE RESISTED ELIMINATING THE 
LOOPHOLE THROUGH INTERPRETATION. 
The STB and the courts have referred to projects falling 
within the ICCTA regulatory loophole as “ancillary” projects 
because they are outside the scope of STB’s licensing authority 
and therefore do not trigger NEPA requirements.122 This term 
is confusing because courts have also used the term “ancillary” 
to refer to projects that are ancillary—that is, projects not inte-
gral—to railroad operations, and that therefore may be the sub-
ject of local government regulation.123 A court will only close 
 
 121. See Green Mountain R.R. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 644–45 (2d Cir. 
2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 547 (2005) (refusing to distinguish environmental 
regulations from economic regulations); City of Auburn v. United States, 154 
F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the same distinction). 
 122. See, e.g., Friends of the Aquifer, STB Finance Docket No. 33966, at 3–
4 (STB Aug. 10, 2001), available at http://www.stb.dot.gov/decisions/ 
ReadingRoom.nsf/UNID/4FF2DCB99468FEB785256A960055F496/$file/31505 
.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). 
 123. E.g., In re Vt. Ry., 769 A.2d 648, 653 (Vt. 2000) (“[T]he salt shed at is-
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the loophole if it interprets the ICCTA in a way that allows lo-
cal governments to apply environmental and land use laws to 
all “ancillary” projects or facilities that currently fall within the 
loophole. If a court merely holds that a local government may 
apply environmental and land use laws to projects that are an-
cillary to railroad operations, the regulatory gap will persist. 
Under such a paradigm, local governments will not be able to 
regulate projects that are integral to railroad operations, even if 
the project poses a significant environmental risk and does not 
trigger NEPA review because the project requires no STB li-
cense. 
The STB and courts could close this problematic loophole 
by determining that environmental and land use regulations, 
by their nature, are simply not covered by the ICCTA’s preemp-
tion provision. The plain language and the legislative history of 
the ICCTA support such an interpretation if the STB and 
courts ignore the economic impacts of environmental and land 
use regulations and instead focus on the “non-economic” char-
acter of these laws.124 
The plain language of the ICCTA’s express preemption 
provision gives the STB exclusive jurisdiction not over “rail 
transport,” but instead over “regulation of rail transport.”125 
This suggests that the ICCTA preempts only laws that directly 
manage or govern rail transport and does not preempt envi-
ronmental and land use laws aimed at protecting public health 
and the environment.126 Additionally, the House Transporta-
tion and Infrastructure Committee Report on the ICCTA notes 
that Congress’s intent in enacting the legislation was to “oc-
cupy . . . the entire field of economic regulation of the interstate 
rail transportation system.”127 Thus, if courts were to charac-
terize environmental and land use regulations as “non-
economic,” the ICCTA’s preemption provision would not inter-
fere with local environmental protection efforts. 
Unfortunately, no court has categorically permitted the 
application of environmental and land use regulations. Nota-
 
sue is ancillary to the operations of the rail line.”). 
 124. See Eldredge, supra note 7, at 588–89. 
 125. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2000). 
 126. See Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. City of W. Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 
1331 (11th Cir. 2001); Eldredge, supra note 7, at 588–89. 
 127. H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 95–96 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 793, 807–08 (emphasis added); see also Fla. E. Coast Ry., 266 
F.3d at 1337–38; Eldredge, supra note 7, at 588–89. 
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bly, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that it might be willing to 
take such an approach in Florida East Coast Railway Co. v. 
City of West Palm Beach when it determined that the ICCTA 
did not preempt West Palm Beach’s zoning ordinances as ap-
plied to the lessee of railroad property.128 After examining the 
plain language and legislative history of the ICCTA, the court 
declared that the city could apply its zoning law because “West 
Palm Beach’s zoning requirements do not impede the interstate 
functioning of the railroad industry.”129 But the court ulti-
mately emphasized that the ICCTA might preempt the city’s 
zoning ordinances as applied directly to a railroad rather than 
to a lessee. Thus the court declined to adopt a per se rule—one 
permitting the application of zoning laws categorically—that 
would close the regulatory loophole.130 Aside from one excep-
tion, discussed in the next paragraph, all courts have made ini-
tial determinations concerning local regulations’ impact on rail-
road operations before permitting local governments to 
regulate. 
Admittedly, courts have been willing to categorically apply 
one type of local regulation regardless of its impact on railroad 
operations. Where local governments seek to apply laws con-
cerning “railroad safety,” some courts have ignored the regula-
tions’ impact on the industry. For example, in Wheeling & Lake 
Erie Railway Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, a 
Pennsylvania court recognized that states, within the tradi-
tional police power to regulate public safety, may allocate to the 
railroad the costs of constructing, maintaining, and improving 
grade crossings.131 Because railroad safety falls into the 
broader category of public safety, environmental laws that aim 
to promote public safety should also categorically withstand 
ICCTA preemption. 
Courts, however, emphasize the significance of the Federal 
Railroad Safety Act (FRSA),132 an Act which the Supreme 
Court has said displays “considerable solicitude” for state 
 
 128. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 266 F.3d at 1337–39. 
 129. Id. at 1339. 
 130. Id. at 1332 (“We are not called upon to decide whether federal law 
would constrain the City’s exercise of its police power to limit [the railroad’s] 
operations should it engage in an aggregate distribution business in exactly 
the same manner as [the lessee].”). 
 131. See 778 A.2d 785, 791–92 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001); Home of Econ. v. 
Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 694 N.W.2d 840, 846 (N.D. 2005) (“[T]he ICCTA 
does not explicitly preempt state law regarding grade crossings . . . .”). 
 132. 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101–20153 (2000). 
STUCKY_4FMT 2/22/2007 10:14:05 AM 
858 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:836 
 
law.133 One court explained: 
[O]ne can only presume that if there existed a federal law preserving 
an explicit sphere of state authority for railroad environmental laws, 
as the FRSA does in the area of rail safety, [a case in which the court 
found that the ICCTA preempted local environmental laws] may have 
come out differently.134 
Thus courts and the STB are likely to continue distinguishing 
railroad safety laws from environmental laws and to refuse to 
apply the latter without first considering the laws’ impact on 
railroad operations under the ICCTA preemption provision. 
Significantly, the Ninth and Second Circuits flatly rejected 
the argument that environmental laws escape ICCTA preemp-
tion because of their “non-economic” nature.135 The Ninth Cir-
cuit declared that the nature of a law does not determine 
whether it is preempted under the ICCTA,136 and both courts 
suggested that such a system would be unworkable because the 
economic effects of environmental regulations make it impossi-
ble to clearly distinguish between economic and environmental 
regulations.137 The Second Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning that “if local authorities have the ability to impose 
‘environmental’ permitting regulations on the railroad, such 
power will in fact amount to ‘economic regulation’ if the carrier 
is prevented from constructing, acquiring, operating, abandon-
ing, or discontinuing a line.”138 
B. A STATUTORY FIX FOR THE REGULATORY LOOPHOLE 
Given the reluctance of the STB and courts to interpret the 
ICCTA in a way that eliminates the regulatory loophole, and 
given the difficulty of defining terms like “economic,” it will 
likely take a statutory amendment to ensure that railroad pro-
jects will not pose unacceptable risks to communities. Congress 
could take a variety of approaches. It could eliminate the pre-
emption provisions altogether; however, this would signifi-
cantly undermine Congress’s goal of creating a uniform system 
 
 133. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 662, 665 (1993). 
 134. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, No. Civ. A. 05-338 (EGS), 2005 WL 
902130, at *12 n.20 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2005), rev’d, 406 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). 
 135. See Green Mountain R.R. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 644 (2d Cir. 
2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 547 (2005); City of Auburn v. United States, 154 
F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 136. Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1031. 
 137. Green Mountain, 404 F.3d at 644; Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1031. 
 138. Green Mountain, 404 F.3d at 644 (quoting Auburn, 154 F.3d at 1031). 
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of regulation.139 If Congress created a more limited exception, 
such as permitting local governments to apply zoning, land use, 
and environmental laws, Congress would face the added diffi-
culty of defining the terms zoning, land use, and environ-
mental. 
With these challenges in mind, the best way to close the 
loophole is to subject railroad projects to more STB scrutiny. 
Congress could give the STB more authority to review and ap-
prove projects under the ICCTA. For example, Congress might 
require companies to obtain a license before undertaking any 
railroad project that is likely to have a significant effect on the 
environment.140 Like the STB’s issuance of other licenses under 
the ICCTA,141 the issuing of such an environmental effects li-
cense would qualify as a “major federal action[]” and trigger a 
NEPA review.142 Thus, when a railroad company applies for an 
environmental effects license, the STB would prepare and con-
sider an environmental impact statement pursuant to NEPA 
and issue a license accordingly.143 If a railroad company ig-
nored its obligation to apply for an “environmental effects” li-
cense, local governments or concerned citizens could petition 
the STB. Thus, citizens would gain some assurance that a neu-
tral party would consider environmental impacts in the deci-
sion-making process. 
Because commentators have leveled so much criticism at 
NEPA,144 it is worth exploring another potential solution. Con-
 
 139. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 96 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 793, 808 (“Although States retain the police powers reserved by 
the Constitution, the Federal scheme of economic regulation . . . is intended to 
. . . be completely exclusive. Any other construction would undermine the uni-
formity of Federal standards . . . .”). 
 140. See Eldredge, supra note 7, at 585 (“Congress could expand the STB’s 
licensing authority to encompass a broader range of railroad activities.”). 
 141. See 49 U.S.C. § 10901–10907 (2000). 
 142. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000). 
 143. See id. 
 144. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 811–12 (2d 
ed. 1994); Matthew J. Lindstrom, Procedures Without Purpose: The Withering 
Away of the National Environmental Policy Act’s Substantive Law, 20 J. LAND 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 245 (2000); James T.B. Tripp & Nathan G. Alley, 
Streamlining NEPA’s Environmental Review Process: Suggestions for Agency 
Reform, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 74 (2003); Oliver A. Houck, Is That All?, 11 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL. F. 173 passim (2000) (reviewing LYNTON KEITH CALD-
WELL, A REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, AN AGENDA 
FOR THE FUTURE (1998); NEPA TASK FORCE, THE NEPA TASK FORCE REP. TO 
THE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY (2003), http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/ntf/report/ 
finalreport.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). 
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gress could seize this opportunity to experiment with a modi-
fied version of NEPA that would apply directly to railroad com-
panies. As noted above, NEPA requires federal agencies, as op-
posed to private companies, to prepare and consider 
environmental impact statements before undertaking any “ma-
jor Federal action[]” likely to have a significant effect on the 
environment.145 Normally—because of the “major Federal ac-
tion[]” stipulation—NEPA only applies to a private project if it 
benefits from federal funding or if it requires a federal li-
cense.146 For example, NEPA does not require agencies to re-
view the environmental impacts of railroad projects undertaken 
by private companies unless the project requires a federal li-
cense, such as a license for a line extension or a new line.147 
However, because railroads are an instrumentality of interstate 
commerce, Congress could enact a NEPA-like statute that 
would apply directly to railroad companies.148 
The railroad-specific NEPA would require the railroad 
company itself—rather than the STB—to (1) determine if a pro-
ject is likely to have a significant effect on the environment and 
(2) prepare and consider an environmental impact statement if 
the project is likely to have significant environmental effect. As 
in NEPA, Congress would require the railroad company, in de-
ciding on a course of action, to consider environmentally pref-
erable alternatives,149 to provide the public with relevant in-
formation,150 and to assess and consider public comments.151 It 
 
 145. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (“[A]ll agencies of the Federal Government 
shall include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation 
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the hu-
man environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official . . . .”). 
 146. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a) (2005) (“[Major Federal a]ctions include 
new and continuing activities, including projects and programs entirely or 
partly financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal agen-
cies . . . .”). 
 147. See 49 U.S.C. § 10901(a) (2000); Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Sur-
face Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 533 (8th Cir. 2003) (describing the STB’s ap-
proval process, which includes environmental impact assessment under 
NEPA). 
 148. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (“Congress is empow-
ered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or 
persons or things in interstate commerce . . . .”). 
 149. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E). 
 150. See 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(4); Council on Environmental Quality, 
Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting the Environment, Guide-
lines § 10(e), 36 Fed. Reg. 7724, 7726 (Apr. 23, 1971) (“In accord with [NEPA,] 
agencies have a responsibility to develop procedures to insure the fullest prac-
ticable provision of timely public information [regarding] programs with envi-
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is true that such a proposal would authorize railroad companies 
both to determine whether a project is likely to have a signifi-
cant effect on the environment and to decide on an appropriate 
course of action. However, citizens and local governments 
would be able to challenge such decisions in courts or before the 
STB. 
To address criticisms and experiment with changes, the 
railroad-specific NEPA should differ from NEPA in two impor-
tant respects. First, the new statute should impose substantive, 
as well as procedural, requirements. Second, the statute should 
require railroad companies to develop and implement a moni-
toring plan whenever their initial finding of no significant envi-
ronmental impact is based on proposed mitigation measures. 
1. Substantive Requirements 
The Supreme Court interprets NEPA as creating only pro-
cedural requirements.152 Courts reviewing an agency’s compli-
ance with NEPA may consider only whether the agency took 
the proper procedural steps and not whether the agency’s deci-
sion adequately protects the environment.153 Simply put, under 
NEPA, courts may only review whether the agency adequately 
considered the environmental consequences of its decision:154 
[O]nce an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA’s procedural 
requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has 
considered the environmental consequences; it cannot “interject itself 
within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the ac-
tion to be taken.”155 
Congress should take note that, under a similar railroad-
specific NEPA, railroad companies would be free to make un-
wise and costly environmental decisions as long as they fol-
lowed proper procedure. Accordingly, Congress should incorpo-
 
ronmental impact . . . .”). 
 151. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4(a). 
 152. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (“NEPA does set forth significant substantive 
goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural. 
It is to insure a fully informed and well-considered decision . . . .” (citations 
omitted)). 
 153. Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 
227–28 (1980). 
 154. See Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National Environmental Policy 
Act: Substantive Law Adaptations from NEPA’s Progeny, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 207, 220 (1992). 
 155. Strycker’s, 444 U.S. at 227–28 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 
U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)). 
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rate substantive requirements into any railroad-specific NEPA. 
There are several ways to accomplish such a goal. For example, 
Congress could impose substantive obligations on railroad 
companies by explicitly requiring them either to (1) choose a 
plan that does the least environmental damage or (2) mitigate 
the harmful effects of a proposed action when other important 
interests tip the scales in favor of taking the action, despite the 
environmental harm which will result.156 Alternatively, Con-
gress could simply require railroad companies to give due con-
sideration to preventing environmental damage, leaving courts 
to determine how much consideration certain environmental 
risks warrant.157 
2. Monitoring Mitigation Efforts 
Federal agencies frequently avoid preparing the detailed 
and time-consuming environmental impact statements re-
quired by NEPA. They accomplish this by performing a pre-
liminary review of the project, known as an environmental as-
sessment, and determining that the project is not likely to have 
a significant impact on the environment.158 Such a finding is 
called a “finding of no significant impact” or a FONSI.159 FON-
SIs have become the rule rather than the exception under 
NEPA: federal agencies prepare approximately five hundred 
environmental impact studies (EIS) annually, as compared to 
fifty thousand environmental assessments that lead to FON-
SIs.160 
Sometimes, when making a FONSI, agencies rely on miti-
gation measures. That is, agencies “reduce expected environ-
mental impacts below the EIS-triggering threshold level of ‘sig-
nificant’” in order to “avoid the cost and administrative burden 
associated with a full [EIS].”161 Critics stress that agencies ig-
 
 156. See Ferester, supra note 154, at 211 (discussing the way NEPA ought 
to have been interpreted). 
 157. Id. at 248–49 (discussing a New York law similar to NEPA that re-
quires public agencies to give “due consideration” to environmental conse-
quences, thus “ensur[ing] that agencies focus their attention not only on pro-
ducing environmental documents, but also on the prevention of environmental 
damage”). 
 158. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and 
Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
903, 903, 909–10 (2002). 
 159. Id. at 903. 
 160. Id. at 909–10. 
 161. Id. at 908. 
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nore the initial, unmitigated state of project proposals and use 
the mitigated FONSI on projects for which Congress intended 
to trigger a full EIS.162 When agencies avoid formal EIS re-
quirements, they have less information on which to base their 
decisions, including information that is normally supplied by 
the public in the EIS development process.163 Nevertheless, 
courts generally uphold agencies’ mitigated FONSI determina-
tions.164 
Some commentators, however, recognize that the mitigated 
FONSI offers important benefits that should not be ignored—
namely significant cost and time savings—and that the proce-
dure can be adjusted so as to provide adequate environmental 
protections.165 In his article, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Moni-
toring and Managing Government’s Environmental Perform-
ance, Professor Bradley Karkkainen closely examines the miti-
gated FONSI and offers several recommendations for 
improvement.166 While Congress might consider many of his 
proposals in revising NEPA, one is particularly relevant to the 
railroad-specific NEPA contemplated here. 
Karkkainen notes that ordinarily after an agency issues a 
mitigated FONSI, the agency is under no obligation to follow 
up on its decision.167 Consequently, if the mitigation measures 
turn out to be inadequate and the environmental impacts of the 
project are significant, concerned parties have no recourse.168 
Congress, however, might easily correct this problem. Consis-
tent with Karkkainen’s proposal, whenever a railroad company 
avoids preparing an EIS by using a mitigated FONSI, Congress 
should require the company to develop and implement a moni-
toring plan. The plan would “verify over the life of the project 
that the actual environmental impacts remain[] below the 
statutory threshold level of ‘significant.’”169 If the environ-
 
 162. See, e.g., id. at 934. 
 163. Peter J. Eglick & Henryk J. Hiller, The Myth of Mitigation Under 
NEPA and SEPA, 20 ENVTL. L. 773, 776 (1990). 
 164. See Karkkainen, supra note 158, at 932 n.129 (listing cases in which 
courts have upheld agencies’ mitigated FONSI determinations). 
 165. See, e.g., id. at 934–37. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See id. at 927. 
 168. See id. 
 169. Id. at 943. The meaning of the word “significantly,” as used in NEPA, 
depends on a variety of factors. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (2005); Dinah Bear, 
NEPA at 19: A Primer on an ‘Old’ Law with Solutions to New Problems, 19 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10060, 10064 (1989). 
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mental impacts subsequently rise to the level of significant, 
Congress would require the company either to prepare a full 
EIS or to revise the mitigation measures to adequately reduce 
the project’s environmental impact.170 
By enacting such a railroad-specific NEPA with the two ad-
justments highlighted above, Congress can close the regulatory 
loophole created by the ICCTA while minimizing the burdens 
placed on railroad companies and the STB. Additionally, the 
proposed statute would allow Congress to experiment with 
NEPA reform on a small segment of projects, thus avoiding the 
potential cumulative effects of mistakes made on a grander 
scale. 
  CONCLUSION   
While state and local governments normally control land 
use decisions, the ICCTA generally preempts local authority 
where those decisions affect railroad companies. NEPA compels 
the STB to perform an assessment of environmental impacts 
before authorizing railroads to undertake projects; however, 
there are some railroad projects over which the STB lacks li-
censing authority. Where the STB lacks licensing authority, the 
ICCTA—despite preempting state and local law—does not au-
thorize the STB to conduct a NEPA analysis and prevent envi-
ronmental harm. If a railroad project falls within this loophole, 
there is presently very little a community can do to prevent a 
railroad company from taking risks that could have devastating 
impacts on the environment and public health, as demon-
strated by the Spokane Valley-Rathdrum Prairie Aquifer case 
study. 
Courts and the STB have refused to enforce local environ-
mental and land use regulations where those regulations im-
pact railway operations, even where the environmental threat 
is significant and federal law imposes no restrictions. Conse-
quently, Congress must close the regulatory loophole to protect 
communities from unwarranted environmental threats. This 
can be accomplished by enacting a statute closely resembling 
NEPA but requiring railroad companies, rather than federal 
government agencies, to consider the environmental impacts of 
their proposed actions. Such a NEPA-like statute, if carefully 
crafted, would close the loophole directly, while minimizing the 
burdens imposed on railroad companies. 
 
 170. See Karkkainen, supra note 158, at 943–44. 
